In an effort to control spiraling healthcare costs, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) was established as a part of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010. Its purpose was to identify and test Alternative Payment Models (APMs)—innovative healthcare payment structures that reduce Medicare and Medicaid spending while maintaining the same quality of care provided to their beneficiaries.
The CMMI has tested more than 50 APMs that have found varied success. Only a handful of payment models have been able to demonstrate significant cost control without sacrificing quality—one of those being the Maryland All-Payer Model (MDAPM).
The MDAPM is a payment model unique to the state of Maryland, aimed at generating savings by regulating how much its hospitals are reimbursed for medical care. Under Section 1814b of the Social Security Act, states can deviate from standard Medicare payments systems if they are able to demonstrate that an alternative payment system is effective in containing costs without sacrificing quality and access to care.
Maryland was the first state to take advantage of this provision. In 1997, it established the Maryland Health Services Cost Review Commission (HSCRC), an independent state agency that was responsible for setting hospital reimbursement rates to “promote cost containment, access to care, equity, financial stability and hospital accountability”.
Maryland operated under this model until its healthcare costs per patient admission began rising faster than the national rate. In 2014, the HSCRC responded by building on Maryland’s hospital reimbursement system to create the MDAPM.
The MDAPM’s core provision is limiting each hospital’s payments to a “global budget”—a budget based on the total amount of expected annual revenue for a hospital, predetermined by the Maryland HSCRC. This budget was based on revenue from previous years, adjusted for several factors like inflation and shifting population demographics. Once global budgets were established, the HSCRC set payer reimbursement rates for hospitals to match these global budgets, based on projections in expected volume. This system limited the amount of revenue hospitals could generate in a given year, transferring profit drivers from service volume and throughput to savings and effective utilization.
As an experimental payment model overseen by the CMMI, the MDAPM was only scheduled to last for a 5-year period and had to maintain several performance benchmarks throughout its existence. These included limiting the all-payer hospital cost growth rate to 3.58%, generating $330 million in savings for Medicare, and reducing 30-day readmissions to the Medicare national average. If Maryland failed to meet such benchmarks, the CMS had the authority to impose penalties, terminate the model agreement, and revert Maryland to the national payment system.
Following its implementation, the CMS contracted with RTI International to evaluate the effectiveness of the MDAPM’s provisions across the 6 domains below, with expected outcomes in mind for each:
- Hospital Financial Performance: Fixed budgets emphasized cost-savings as a means to drive profits, primarily by shifting patient care from inpatient to outpatient settings whenever possible.
- Utilization: Hospitals were rewarded or penalized based on readmissions rates, with the largest target being a reduction in potentially avoidable utilization.
- Health Care Expenditures: The savings incentives from budget ceilings set the expectation that expenditure growth would decrease (although lower-cost hospital departments would see spending increases as care was rerouted there).
- Quality of Care: Rewards and penalties for quality of care meant that hospitals were expected to invest in care management, improve care transitions, decrease readmission, and reduce LOS.
- Hospital Service Mix: Hospital service mix—the complexity of the patients being treated in the inpatient setting—was expected to increase as unnecessary, lower acuity admissions were reduced.
- Spillover to Other Sector: Rerouting care elsewhere to avoid spending was a key concern—hospitals were expected to invest in preadmission services and post-acute care (PAC) to streamline care transitions.
To assist hospitals in meeting the goals of the MDAPMs, the CMS and Maryland modified their agreement to include the Care Redesign Program (CRP), which began operating in July of 2017. The CRP’s core objective was to improve patient transitions between care settings and emphasize population health management. Through creating partnerships with external community-based providers and by emphasizing primary care initiatives, the CRP had the goal of helping hospitals keep patients healthy at a lower cost.
The CRP was comprised of two distinct initiatives. The first, the Hospital Care Improvement Program (HCIP), engaged hospital-based providers in improving hospital care quality and patient transitions between care settings. The second, the Complex and Chronic Care Improvement Program (CCIP), engaged community-based providers in managing the health needs of high-cost patients. Under the CRP, hospitals provided participating physicians with a share of financial savings generated from proactive, lower-cost interventions. Provider participation in the CRP and its impact on outcomes were used to evaluate both the CRP and the MDAPM.
The performance of Maryland hospitals under the MDAPM was evaluated against comparable hospitals across the country, as defined by hospital and county characteristics, demographics, and market profiles. By matching Maryland hospitals with “equivalent” counterparts, a control group was established to assess the impacts of the MDAPM provisions.
So how did the MDAPM do?
Results were divided into two categories—qualitative, based on interviews and survey results from participating providers and healthcare leaders, and quantitative, based on hospital performance in certain predetermined metrics.